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I Liturgy for the MeantimeOn Beauty, Justice, and WorshipTed A. SmithIn the New Jerusalem, justice and beauty come 
together in glory. The city is just: God is on 
the throne, and the kings of the earth come to 
pay homage. Those who weep find comfort, the 
thirsty receive water, and the forces of injustice 
are so thoroughly vanquished that there is no 
need to close the gates of the city. The city is not 
only just, but also beautiful: Those unclosed gates 
are made of pearls, the street is translucent gold, 
and, at the center of it all, the One on the throne 
shines with a beauty so radiant that the whole city 
is illuminated. The wonder of the city is not just 
that it features both beauty and justice. It is that 
in the glorious presence of God any distinction 
between the two burns away. The beauty of 
God is just, and the justice of God is beautiful 
(Revelation 21—22).
So it is in the New Jerusalem. But in a workaday 
meeting of a worship committee, beauty and justice 
more often jostle for priority. Sometimes proposals 
for beauty are resisted in the name of justice, as 
when a member objects to the purchase of new 
paraments on the grounds that the money should 
be spent for the poor. Sometimes proposals for 
justice are resisted in the name of beauty, as when 
revisions of a hymn for more inclusive language 
meet opposition because they are ungainly—not 
because the objector disagrees with the theological 
and ethical motives behind the change, but simply 
because she believes they make the hymn less 
beautiful. In the fullness of God’s time, justice and 
beauty may embrace so closely as to become one. 
But in the meantime, and especially in this time, 
they stand in tension.
The tension between justice and beauty can 
be so pervasive that it comes to feel natural, given, 
universal, and unchanging. But it has emerged in 
time, a product of human choices. And it has emerged 
especially in Western Europe and North America, 
and most acutely among Protestant Christians. It has 
emerged through two deep shifts that help to define 
late modern society: the ascendance of ethics as the 
primary content of religion and the differentiation 
of religious, aesthetic, political, economic, and other 
“spheres” of life. These developments are not by any 
means total. Exceptions abound, and reversals are 
already under way. But these twin developments go 
a long way in explaining how “justice” and “beauty” 
have become keywords for us—the kind of words 
that might frame an issue of Call to Worship—and 
how the church has come to experience tensions 
between justice and beauty in its liturgy.1
In the first moves of this essay I try to account 
for the tensions we often experience between beauty 
and justice. I try to describe the ways in which justice 
came to be so essential to some Christian traditions 
and the ways in which beauty came to be defined 
over and against justice. I try to explain why the 
conflict between beauty and justice plays out within 
the church, and not only between the church and 
other institutions. I then look at the main way that 
Reformed Christians have coped with the tension 
between justice and beauty: by making beauty a 
means to other ends, especially to the end of justice. I 
want to argue that this instrumental account of beauty 
leaves our worship impoverished. I also want to 
resist alternatives that seek to dissolve the difference 
between justice and beauty or to reverse their priority, 
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making justice a means to the end of beauty. In the 
end I invite the church to live more deeply into the 
tension we experience between beauty and justice. 
That tension is not necessary or natural, but that 
does not mean that it can or should be wished away. 
It arose in time out of some of the deepest currents 
in Jewish and Christian traditions. Our task is not 
to dissolve it, but to understand it in ways that open 
up new space for faithful discernment and vibrant 
worship—and even to see the tension as itself a form of 
witness, a groaning prayer for the New Jerusalem, an 
embodiment of our refusal to settle for anything less.
The Religion of Justice
It is hard to overestimate 
the significance of ethics in the 
lived stuff of contemporary 
Protestant Christianity in the 
United States. One sees the 
ascendance of ethics in core 
practices like preaching. The 
last 200 years have seen a 
steady shift from preaching 
about doctrine to preaching 
about how to live in this 
world. Even when preachers 
take on doctrinal themes, we 
often conclude by asking, 
“So what?” . . . And then 
answering that question in 
the key of ethics, by applying 
doctrine to everyday life. A 
sermon feels incomplete to 
most of us unless it makes 
some connection to questions 
of “real life,” by which we 
mean the choices of our earthly lives. That we 
ascribe the greatest reality to these choices and that 
we feel the need for ethics to complete a sermon, 
underscores the essential role that ethics has come 
to play in contemporary Christianity.
Denominational struggles tell the same tale. 
Doctrinal disputes cut deep divisions between and 
within denominations in the United States as late 
as the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversies of 
the early twentieth century. But all the most divisive 
debates in recent decades have clustered around 
issues in ethics. Debates about the ordination 
of women, racial equality, and sexuality all have 
doctrinal dimensions. But they have arisen and 
gained their defining significance as questions of 
ethics. That we need to remind ourselves that 
“theology matters”—and we do, and it does—only 
underscores how struggles over ethics have come to 
define denominational identities.
Even theological studies often are made subject 
to ethical concerns. A loose form of pragmatism cuts 
across many contemporary theological movements 
that hold that the right doctrine is known by 
the good results it produces in this world. With 
the rise of historical and critical methods, and 
the on-the-ground fact of 
enduring pluralism, we have 
lost widely accepted criteria 
for what would count as 
accurate speech about God. 
While the same skepticism 
and pluralism mark our 
ethical debates, we seem 
to have more confidence 
in our evaluations of the 
earthly effects of our beliefs. 
We scarcely know how to 
argue about a doctrine like 
the Trinity without turning 
the conversation to ethics. 
Arguments about what is 
true tend to get transfigured 
into arguments about what 
is good.
One can read this as a 
kind of secularization at work 
within Christianity itself. It 
does not bring the end of 
Christianity, but it transforms 
Christianity into something 
that is primarily about relations between humans 
and other members of the created order. It shifts 
the emphasis to that which can be observed, to 
this-worldly relations. God remains in the picture, 
but primarily as the one who establishes norms 
and then gives motives for ethical action. There 
are important exceptions to this shift, and not only 
among pastors and academic theologians. Fidelity 
to creeds and care for church buildings—two wide 
and deep currents in the Presbyterian Church 
(U.S.A.)—cannot be reduced to ethics. But each of 
these pieties regularly faces ethical challenges. If 
In the end I invite the church to 
live more deeply into the tension 
we experience between beauty and 
justice. . . . Our task is not to dissolve 
it, but to understand it in ways that 
open up new space for faithful 
discernment and vibrant worship—
and even to see the tension as itself a 
form of witness, a groaning prayer for 
the New Jerusalem, an embodiment of 
our refusal to settle for anything less.
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lived American Protestantism cannot be reduced 
to ethics, it also cannot be imagined apart from 
defining commitments to ethics, and especially 
the forms of ethics that can be distinguished from 
personal piety, the social forms of ethics whose 
watchword is justice.
The rise of justice as the core content of modern 
Protestantism should not be seen only as a form of 
secularization. It also should be seen as a working 
out of some of the deepest commitments in Jewish 
and Christian traditions. The prophet of Isaiah 58, for 
example, offered an ethical critique of fasting, railing 
against a liturgical form that had become oppressive 
and then redefining it with justice at its core. Speaking 
in the voice of the Lord, the prophet says:
Is not this the fast that I choose:
 to loose the bonds of injustice,
 to undo the thongs of the yoke,
to let the oppressed go free,
 and to break every yoke?
Is it not to share your bread with the hungry,
 and bring the homeless poor into your house;
when you see the naked, to cover them,
 and not to hide yourself from your own kin? 
(Isaiah 58:6–7)
Jesus picks up this theme when his public 
ministry begins. If he always was up to more than 
justice, he never was up to less. Just so, Christians 
confess that the reign of God brings the fulfillment 
of ethics, not the negation. The rise of justice to 
define much of modern Christianity is not only 
a story of secularization; it is a story of deep and 
costly faithfulness.
The Beautiful Against the Good
If one historical process has seen justice move to 
a central place in religious life, a second, intertwined 
process has produced an idea of beauty that is defined 
over against justice, especially the justice associated 
with the church. Sociologist Max Weber described 
this process as the differentiation of spheres of 
society and named it as a constitutive feature of 
modernity. The emergence of modern nation-states 
depended on a separation between political and 
religious spheres, for instance, and modern market 
economies had to differentiate themselves from 
political, religious, and domestic spheres. Weber 
described a process in which each of these spheres 
slowly “rationalized” itself toward the pursuit of 
its own core value. This rationalization intensified 
differences between spheres. The domestic sphere, 
for instance, became oriented more and more to 
nurture even as the economic sphere shook off 
every distraction from the goal of gain. Because 
each sphere asserted its own goal as ultimate and 
because the goals defined themselves in opposition 
to one another, the spheres became distinct to the 
point of becoming incompatible. Modern people 
live across and between the spheres, experiencing 
the contradictory demands they place on us. We 
live, Weber writes, in a kind of disenchanted 
polytheism.2 We serve the goal of gain at work, of 
nurture at home . . . and when we plan worship we 
must decide to serve justice or beauty. 
The cleft between a religious sphere oriented 
toward justice and an aesthetic sphere oriented 
toward beauty runs especially deep. But the religious 
and aesthetic spheres have not always been so 
divided. Religions of the world, Christianity not 
least among them, have stimulated and sponsored 
an enormous range of artistic activities. Exactly that 
early connection made religion the sphere against 
which art had to define itself in order to emerge 
as a freestanding sphere in its own right—even as a 
rationalizing religion of justice sought to distance 
itself from the distractions of beauty. The tensions 
we experience between beauty and justice, then, 
are not accidental. They are hard-wired into the 
meanings those words have for us.
The justice of what Weber called “ethical” or 
“prophetic” religion came to be defined largely 
in opposition to aesthetic values like beauty. The 
iconoclastic impulse has always been especially 
severe toward visual arts. It has led Christians and 
Jews to insist on some distinction between what 
was most definitive about religion—truth, justice, the 
name of God, or something else—and the appearance 
of beauty. The second commandment insisted that 
no graven image, no matter how beautiful, could 
be identical to God. Second Isaiah presented the 
Suffering Servant—beaten, shamed, and ugly—as 
God’s own. That long tradition has taken violent 
forms, like the icon-smashing halberds of Oliver 
Cromwell’s army. But it also has taken forms that 
can feel like modest common sense, as when the 
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PC(USA)’s Directory for Worship acknowledges 
the appropriateness of “creative expressions in 
architecture, furnishings, appointments, vestments, 
music, drama, language, and movement,” so long 
as they “awaken us to God’s presence.” But “when 
they call attention to themselves, or are present for 
their beauty as an end in itself, they are idolatrous.”3 
Beauty can never be an end in itself for the religious 
sphere that we have inherited, for beauty’s secondary 
status is one of that sphere’s defining characteristics.
The divorce between aesthetic and religious 
spheres involved petitions from both sides. Even as 
influential religious traditions distanced themselves 
from art, significant artistic productions gradually 
declared their independence from religion. The 
rationalization of the aesthetic sphere meant that it 
pursued a goal proper to itself—like beauty—rather 
than the goals of ethics, politics, religion, or any 
other sphere of life. Art wrenched from its religious 
context, Theodor Adorno writes, “is magic delivered 
from the lie of being truth.”4 “Art for art’s sake” came 
to define the purpose of at least high art, and so of 
the aesthetic sphere. Autonomous art cast itself as 
indifferent or even hostile to ethics and religion. Bad 
things, even ungodly things, could be beautiful. In 
the 1857 collection of poems he entitled Les Fleurs 
du Mal—The Flowers of Evil—Charles Baudelaire both 
theorized this movement and became its icon. His 
“Hymn to Beauty” sang praise to a beauty undefined 
by relation to God or good:5
What matter if you come from heaven or hell, 
O Beauty! Monster huge, alarming, pure!
If with your eyes, your smile, you let me dwell
In loved Infinity unknown before?
From Satan or from God, seraph or fiend,
What matter if – fairy with velvet eyes,
O rhythm, fragrance, light, my only queen! –
You make the world less grim, time faster fly? 
It mattered not to an increasingly self-sufficient 
aesthetic sphere whether beauty served the God of 
justice. All the better if it did not. And, as Weber 
saw, the beauty of an autonomous aesthetic sphere 
came to offer its own brand of salvation. The 
museum became a kind of cathedral, complete with 
priesthood, canon, ritual, and hushed experiences 
of awe. An emancipated aesthetic sphere promised 
beauty as a value independent of any other, the 
ground and meaning of life. With this assertion 
the tension between religion and art broke out 
into open hostility. Art’s relations have been most 
antagonistic with those “prophetic” traditions that 
emphasize the justice of God. Beauty and justice 
became rivals, and their rivalry became one of the 
constitutive features of modernity.6 
A Tension Within the Church
The rivalry between justice and beauty runs 
right through the church. One might think that a 
congregation would stand clearly within the religious 
sphere and so orient itself exclusively to justice. 
But the “spheres” of which Weber wrote are not 
quite identical with on-the-ground institutions like 
my home congregation, St. Andrew’s Presbyterian 
Church, or the major art museum in the town where 
I live, Nashville’s Frist Center for the Visual Arts. 
Actual institutions—like individuals—usually find 
themselves pulled between different spheres. 
If museums rarely take up explicit religious 
confessions, they often do the work of ethical 
religion. When the Frist Center displays works 
from some long-disrespected group or finds a way 
to open its doors to people otherwise excluded, it 
serves the claims of justice. 
Just as institutions identified with the aesthetic 
sphere often serve justice, institutions identified 
with the religious sphere often serve beauty. Mark 
Chaves’ landmark study of U.S. congregations found 
that most congregations devoted more time, energy, 
and money to worship and religious education 
than to any other work. In performing those two 
tasks, “congregations generate as a by-product more 
artistic activity than either social services or political 
activity.” Although many congregations understand 
themselves to be primarily about ethical matters, 
Chaves concluded, they “facilitate art, and perhaps, 
on occasion, even beauty, more commonly and 
more intensively than they pursue either charity 
or justice.”7 That analysis fits St. Andrew’s, which 
strives for a vigorous outreach program but still 
devotes more time and money to the creation of 
sermons, music, and other cultural forms. Museums 
work for justice, and congregations produce beauty. 
The rivalry of religious and aesthetic spheres, then, 
plays out not so much between institutions as within 
them. The Frist Center must decide how to balance 
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the demands of justice and beauty in its daily work. 
And so must St. Andrew’s Presbyterian Church.
Coping with Conflict:  
Beauty as a Means to Higher Ends
Worshiping communities cope with the tension 
between beauty and justice in a variety of ways. 
In a small but growing number of congregations, 
beauty simply takes the field, with any ethical 
purpose clearly secondary. But more often beauty 
plays some kind of subordinate role. It might be 
an afterthought, as when a worship planning team 
designs the liturgy with justice in mind and then 
tries to make it as lovely as possible. Beauty also can 
appear as something important but derivative—a 
good defined in terms of justice, as when a church 
that believes in egalitarian patterns of authority sees 
seating patterns that reflect those beliefs as the most 
beautiful ones, or when fair-trade standards come 
to define what makes coffee taste good. Here the 
quality of beauty does not just serve justice but is 
defined by its association with justice. 
The most common relationship casts beauty as 
a means to the end of justice, or some other ethical 
end. Reformed Christians especially have tended to 
resolve conflicts between the aesthetic and religious 
spheres by making the aesthetic instrumental to 
ultimate religious goods. Beauty, once banished, 
regains legitimacy as a means to higher ends.
Older Reformed theologies tended to make 
beauty instrumental to truth. John Calvin, for all his 
iconoclasm, did not despise the beauty of the material 
world. He famously described the world as a “dazzling 
theatre . . . full of proofs of heavenly providence.” 
Illumined by the Word of God, the beauty of the 
world testified to the glory of God. Calvin made room 
for beauty but not as an end in itself. It served as a 
means to the higher end of true knowledge of God, 
so Calvin placed this discussion of beauty in Book I 
of the Institutes on the knowledge of God the Creator.8 
Puritan “plain style” preaching extended this 
basic vision to make rhetoric—beautiful speech—
instrumental to the communication of true doctrine. 
Plain-style preachers did make self-conscious use 
of rhetorical devices, but they followed the strict 
division between rhetoric and dialectic proposed 
by Peter Ramus, Regius professor of eloquence and 
philosophy at the University of Paris in the sixteenth 
century. The Ramist system made rhetoric, in 
historian Perry Miller’s words, “severely secondary 
to logic.”9 Beautiful speech was not evil. Even God 
made use of it to accommodate divine truths to 
fallen minds. But rhetoric was as distinct from 
truth as ornamental lace was from the body of 
a gown. It was tacked on, secondary. And it was 
suspect. It could lead just as easily to error as to 
truth. Whatever value rhetoric had was gained by 
association with the truth it made persuasive.10 
The rise of ethics did not change the instrumental 
role of beauty. It simply changed the end for 
which beauty was a means. The great nineteenth-
century revivalist Charles Grandison Finney made 
the dynamic especially clear. “Religion is the work 
of man,” he said in 1834. “It is something for man 
to do.”11 Finney overturned older Calvinist notions 
of waiting for God to work a revival. Gospel results 
did not depend on special interventions of God, 
Finney said, but on using the right “measures” for 
the work. Finney defined “measures” expansively, 
as whatever ministers needed to use to accomplish 
“the great end of their office, the salvation of 
souls.”12 Measures included things like preaching, 
music, liturgy, architecture, dress, doctrine . . . and 
beauty. Finney made beauty subordinate to the goal 
of moving people to make decisions to vote for God 
as governor of the universe. The goal was specifically 
Christian, but its focus on observable human action 
made the road to other kinds of ethics very short. 
The “new measures” revivals set down an enduring 
habit of mind and action: Beauty had value because 
of its ability to move people to take certain kinds 
of action. That pattern did not have to change to 
Reformed Christians especially have tended to resolve conflicts between the aesthetic  
and religious spheres by making the aesthetic instrumental to ultimate religious 
goods. Beauty, once banished, regains legitimacy as a means to higher ends.
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accommodate very different kinds of actions. Beauty 
could be used to move people to choose Jesus, quit 
drinking, support women’s rights, march for peace, 
take a stand for biblical morality, buy Tide, like Ike, 
or take any number of other actions. If once beauty 
was a means to ends of human knowing, today it is 
more often a means to ends involving human action. 
In churches that have come to define themselves by 
their pursuit of justice, then beauty has become a 
means to justice.
I believe that churches have lost much in 
thinking about beauty primarily as a means to 
justice. Of course, beauty always escapes to play a 
larger role: A church might refine some liturgical 
practice with an eye toward a just end, but over time 
the beauty in that practice comes to be appreciated 
for itself. And when the sense of justice shifts or 
the liturgical practice no longer seems to do its 
instrumental work, our attachment to the beauty of 
the form can give it some inertia that keeps it from 
changing right away. Once-instrumental practices 
hang on for us as beautiful, treasured relics. But 
even when beauty escapes, our thinking about it 
does not.
It is at the level of thinking about beauty that I 
believe we have suffered the greatest loss. Through 
centuries of neglect we have let Christian aesthetic 
vocabularies fall into disrepair. And when we try to 
borrow vocabulary from an autonomous aesthetic 
sphere, we often find it shot through with hostility 
to religion in general and Christianity in particular. 
I hear this impoverishment in conversations with 
the students I teach. It is especially clear in contrast 
with the riches of conversations about ethics. When 
I teach a class in ethics, students bring to the class 
a host of concepts and commitments. They might 
disagree, but they can argue about justice. However, 
when I chair a meeting of the worship committee, 
we all have less with which to work. We can talk 
about “what worked”—instrumental language—and 
we can evaluate the service by (contested) norms of 
justice. We can even evaluate the service according 
to the norms of various liturgical traditions. But 
conversations about beauty have a hard time gaining 
much traction. When they do take off, they usually 
spin quickly into the ditch of individual or cultural 
relativism: Well, that’s beautiful for you or for your 
culture, but not for me and mine. At this point 
justice reasserts itself in the form of a demand 
to respect each individual and culture. Critical 
deliberation stops. We can have complex, intelligent, 
and thoroughly theological disagreements about 
questions of ethics, but we don’t have much to say, 
especially theologically, about aesthetics.13 
The loss is not only conceptual. In the long 
run, subordination of beauty to ethics robs beauty 
of the power that made it useful in the first place. 
As the liturgy is rationalized toward just ends—as 
the beauty in liturgy is increasingly defined by its 
relation to justice—the distinction between beauty 
and justice wears away. Beauty loses its otherness 
and the power that came with it. As beauty is 
assimilated to justice, it loses its power to make us 
lose ourselves. For justice demands reflexivity, self-
consciousness, and the ability to consider ourselves 
from the perspective of others—the very opposite of 
a loss of self-control. And so liturgy that has been 
thoroughly reformed as a means to justice often 
feels as if it is teetering on the edge of a very well-
run committee meeting. Instrumental beauty has 
a shelf-life, and too often our worship seems to be 
happening after the sell-by date.
Two Temptations
The poverty of instrumental beauty can tempt us 
to respond in ways that cheat both justice and beauty. 
In particular, we might find ourselves tempted to try 
to negate the two historical shifts that have defined 
the problem we face. We might try to reverse the 
development of ethical religion by making justice 
subordinate to beauty. We might try to dissolve the 
conflict by undoing the differentiation of justice and 
beauty. Both temptations should be resisted. 
Consider the first temptation: the desire to 
reverse the priority of the spheres, to elevate beauty 
and make ethics lesser and derivative. Two of the 
sharpest critics of modernity—Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Michel Foucault—are sometimes read as making 
this kind of move. But when these two thinkers have 
been appropriated for theology, they have almost 
always been deployed for ethical ends; therefore, their 
critiques have been assimilated with relative ease. A 
much stronger challenge has come from individuals 
and congregations that begin to pursue beautiful 
liturgy for its own sake, leaving ethical and doctrinal 
questions aside. Flickers of this challenge appear in 
movements for liturgical renewal, emergent worship, 
and, perhaps most significantly, the migration of 
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Evangelicals to Anglican, Roman Catholic, and 
Orthodox churches and forms of worship.14 
There is something saving in these moves, I think. 
It can be good to insist on the integrity of beautiful 
liturgy, on its value as an end in itself. But that should 
not lead us to ignore the very real commitments 
to justice that run through every 
faithful expression of Christianity. 
The liturgical renewal movements 
of prophets like Isaiah, Amos, and 
Paul all had ethical commitments that 
could not be reduced or subordinated 
to other goods. 
Moreover, acknowledging that 
beauty is a treasure in its own right 
and that it supplies its own criteria 
for judgment does not mean it has 
no other effects for which it is responsible. The 
pursuit of beauty for its own sake still has social 
consequences and still has questions to answer from 
the sphere of ethics. Twentieth-century liturgical 
reforms in some Catholic churches, for instance, 
had the effect of taking power away from lay 
women and giving it to male priests. The priestly 
reformers might have wanted to clean up what 
they saw as the kitschy clutter of shrines to focus 
attention on the majesty of the altar. They might 
have been driven by the purest reasons of liturgical 
and aesthetic theology. But that would make the 
social consequences of reform unintentional, not 
irrelevant.15 Even so, Evangelicals might set out 
on the trail to Canterbury, Rome, or Byzantium 
seeking only the beauty of holiness. But this would 
not change the fact that such movements often 
grow out of and solidify changes in class status.16 
As sociologist Pierre Bourdieu noticed, “art and 
cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously 
and deliberately or not, to fulfill a social function of 
legitimating social differences.”17 If beauty should 
not be reduced to ethics, the inevitable social 
function of beauty demands that ethics retain its 
own voice in the conversation.
It also can be tempting to see the differentiation 
of justice and beauty as a fall from some earlier, 
holistic, liturgical Eden. We might find ourselves 
longing for an undifferentiated society (be it 
Patristic, Orthodox, Medieval, or something else 
entirely) in which the good is the beautiful is the 
true. Such fantasies depend on severe reductions 
of the historical record. They also forget the real 
good that differentiation has done. As philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas argued, the differentiation of 
spheres has kept the instrumental reason of the 
economic and political spheres from consuming all 
of life. “Art for art’s sake” helped create a kind of 
firewall that has protected the aesthetic sphere from 
complete integration into systems of 
domination. Religious institutions 
have benefited from that firewall even 
as they have tried to find ways to erect 
their own.18
Moreover, fantasies of fusion 
between beauty and justice forget the 
very good reasons why Jewish and 
Christian traditions worked so hard 
to distinguish between them. If the 
differentiation came to its sharpest 
form in the modern period, its roots are much 
older. Those roots are as basic as the insight that a 
very attractive leader might not be a good person. 
They are as old as the second commandment, as 
deep as the cross, and as enduring as the hope for 
a kingdom not of this world. The tensions between 
justice and beauty create problems, but they are 
problems worth having.
Conflict, Discernment, and Witness
Late modern Christians have inherited a deep 
set of tensions between beauty and justice. I have 
argued that we can no longer resolve those tensions 
by making beauty always instrumental to justice, 
and that we should refuse to wish those tensions 
away in the dream of an undivided whole or to 
resolve them anew by reversing priorities and 
making justice always instrumental to beauty. 
Refusing these resolutions means that conflict will 
endure, and calling for the revival of a theological 
vocabulary proper to beauty means hoping that the 
conflict sharpens. 
Such conflict could become destructive. An 
unresolved dialectic also can open up an especially 
rich field for conversation. It makes room for 
a wide range of faithful responses but without 
slipping into irrationalism or relativism. Reasons 
still can be given, arguments still can make sense, 
and large areas of provisional agreement still can 
be found even as ideals of justice and beauty renew 
their contentions.
The tensions between 
justice and beauty create 
problems, but they are 
problems worth having.
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At its best, an unresolved tension between 
justice and beauty prevents the idolatry of either 
pole, both the old idolatry of images and the new 
idolatry of issues. It acknowledges that we do not 
plan liturgy in and for the New Jerusalem, but in 
very earthy cities and for the meantime. It demands 
discernment. If neither beauty nor justice will let 
the other offer a final answer to the question, then 
we are thrown to prayer, and silence, and tentative 
plans, and liturgies that rely on grace for their 
completion. Such worship offers a witness of its 
own. Living in the tensions between justice and 
beauty, the church can receive and share the gift of 
worship that points beyond them both. 
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